On many Android phones, preinstalled apps are annoying but mostly harmless. On some Samsung mid-range devices in West Asia and North Africa, however, a quietly installed system app has become a full-blown controversy. Owners of Galaxy A and Galaxy M phones have discovered AppCloud, a system-level service they never asked for and cannot permanently remove. 
Even if it is disabled, the software reportedly returns after system updates, regaining broad privileges. That combination of persistence, opacity and privileged access has triggered serious questions about security, privacy and Samsung’s overall judgment.
The problem is not simply that AppCloud is there; it is how deeply it is wired into the system. Because it is treated as a core component rather than a regular user app, it enjoys elevated permissions and is protected from normal removal methods. Users cannot uninstall it from settings, cannot control its presence through the Play Store and cannot stop it from reappearing when the operating system is patched. For people who bought a modest Galaxy A or Galaxy M handset as an affordable everyday phone, discovering an undeletable marketing component running underneath their daily apps feels like a breach of trust.
AppCloud itself did not originate inside Samsung. The software comes from ironSource, a company founded in Israel that built its business around user acquisition, monetisation and app recommendations. IronSource later became part of Unity, the major US-based platform best known for powering many mobile and console games. For Samsung, partnering with such a company promised an additional revenue stream and a slick recommendation layer for budget devices. For privacy advocates, however, the merger of a hardware giant and an aggressive ad-tech player created a perfect storm: a marketing engine preloaded deep inside the operating system, with users given little visibility and almost no meaningful choice.
Reports from digital rights groups and security researchers describe AppCloud as collecting extensive behavioural and technical information. In addition to device identifiers, IP addresses and approximate location, the app is said to be able to infer biometric data and build a detailed fingerprint of each handset. Combined with tracking of app usage, content interests and interaction patterns, this allows the service to profile users and predict what they might install next. In theory that means more relevant recommendations and higher advertising revenue. In practice it creates sensitive dossiers on people who never explicitly consented to this level of monitoring, particularly in a region already on edge about surveillance.
Supporters frame AppCloud as a recommendation engine or marketing channel rather than espionage, but the line between aggressive analytics and spyware becomes very thin when transparency is missing. The app has been accused of silently installing additional software that has not been vetted by the person who owns the phone, behaviour that many security professionals consider a red flag. Whether one chooses to label it bloatware, adware or spyware, the lived reality for users is the same: there is a persistent, unremovable process with sweeping privileges on their Galaxy A or Galaxy M phone, and they have no obvious way to fully control it.
That is why the controversy has been particularly intense in the West Asia and North Africa region. In May, Beirut-based digital rights organisation SMEX published an open letter that laid out its concerns in stark terms. The group argued that Samsung had failed to explain how AppCloud functions, what data it collects or how that data is processed and stored. SMEX highlighted that people in the region already face a climate of heightened monitoring and alleged espionage campaigns, and that dropping a powerful, opaque data-collection app into millions of pockets only worsens those risks. For them, the issue is not abstract: it touches on civil liberties, journalistic safety and the privacy of activists.
In its letter, SMEX did more than simply complain; it provided Samsung with a clear list of expectations. First, the company should publish a complete and accessible privacy policy for AppCloud, written in plain language and available to every affected user. Second, there should be an easy, effective way to opt out and remove the app without breaking the device or voiding the warranty. Third, Samsung ought to explain why AppCloud is preinstalled on A and M series phones in the WANA region in particular, and whether similar practices exist elsewhere. Finally, SMEX urged the company to reconsider preloading the app on future devices altogether, invoking the right to privacy enshrined in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and requesting a direct meeting with relevant Samsung teams.
For businesses that deploy fleets of Galaxy A and Galaxy M phones to staff, the stakes are even higher. Corporate devices often carry sensitive contact lists, emails, internal messaging apps and access to company systems. Security specialists warn that any software capable of silently fetching additional apps or code represents a potential attack vector, even if the vendor insists the current implementation is benign. They recommend measures such as strict app whitelisting, where only approved software can be installed, and regular audits of company phones to look for unexpected downloads, hidden services and unexplained reinstalls linked to AppCloud or similar components.
Individual users in the region are not completely powerless, though their options are limited. At a minimum, people can regularly scan their Galaxy A or Galaxy M devices for unfamiliar apps and review which programs have the ability to install other software. Some choose to block AppCloud’s network access via firewall-style tools or privacy-focused DNS services in an effort to cut off data flows. Others turn to Android’s debugging tools to disable or freeze system components via a computer connection, a process that carries its own risks and can be undone by future updates. Rooting the phone or flashing a custom ROM could remove the app entirely, but those steps are complex, can compromise security in other ways and almost always void the manufacturer warranty.
The political context gives the story an even sharper edge. In a region where allegations of digital spying and cross-border data operations are already common, any hint that a mass-market phone may be quietly exfiltrating sensitive information is taken extremely seriously. Some reports suggest that regulators in certain countries are at least considering restrictions or bans on affected Samsung models if the company does not address the concerns quickly enough. Even if such measures never materialise, the mere discussion signals a threat to Samsung’s reputation and market share, especially among security-conscious buyers and institutional customers.
Behind the specific case of AppCloud lies a wider problem with modern smartphones: bloatware has quietly evolved from a nuisance into a structural privacy risk. For years, manufacturers and carriers have used preloaded apps and services as a way to subsidise cheaper hardware or generate ongoing revenue. Many of those apps can now track location, behaviour and device identifiers in fine detail, and they often cannot be removed without technical tricks. In an era when people increasingly live their personal, professional and political lives through their phones, that model collides with the growing expectation that devices should respect user autonomy and the fundamental right to be left alone.
Samsung still has time to shift course and turn the AppCloud saga into an example of responsible corporate behaviour rather than a cautionary tale. The company could start by releasing a detailed technical and privacy breakdown of what the app does, commissioning independent audits and giving users a one-tap method to uninstall it completely. It could revise its contracts with marketing and analytics partners so that no third-party component is ever shipped as undeletable bloatware again, especially in sensitive regions. Most importantly, Samsung could treat consent as something earned through clarity and control, not buried in opaque settings and unchangeable system partitions.
Until that happens, the ball remains firmly in Samsung’s court. AppCloud may have been conceived as a simple way to recommend apps and generate extra income on budget Galaxy A and Galaxy M phones, but its execution has raised deep concerns about how far manufacturers can go in monetising their users. The debate now unfolding in West Asia and North Africa should resonate far beyond the region, prompting regulators, companies and consumers everywhere to reconsider what should be allowed to run silently at the heart of the devices we rely on every day. Whether the industry learns from this controversy or repeats it in new forms will shape the future of smartphone privacy for years to come.
1 comment
people calling it spyware are not wrong, if u cant remove it and it installs stuff by itself thats a huge red flag